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Abstract: In the debate about the form of the 1945 Constitution for 
independent Indonesia, the ideology Pancasila, was coined as a 
compromise between an Islamic and a secular state. Pancasila has been 
an important instrument for positioning religion in Indonesian society, 
however, in various stages of its social and political development, it has 
been interpreted in different ways. It has been used to tame and oppress 
Muslims (until 1965) and to propagate and expand Islamic activities 
during Suharto’s New Order. It has also been used to restrict the 
number of official religions. This limitation has led to serious weakening 
of Pancasila in promoting inter-religious harmony and true freedom of 
religion.
Towards the end of the Pacific War, the Japanese administration started to 
allow discussion on directions for independent Indonesia. On 1 March 1945 they 
instituted a Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Body 
for the Study of Activities leading towards Indonesian Independence), with 
middle-aged Javanese as members.1 There were several Protestant Christians, 
but no Catholics in this 62 (later 68) member organization.2 There were fifteen 
members of Muslim organizations present and they asked for independent 
1 Benda 184 & 284.
2 During the second Dutch military intervention in December 1948, Republican government 
buildings in Yogyakarta were set afire and all reports of these meetings were lost. Reconstruction 
of these developments were made through interviews and later information.
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Indonesia to take the form of an Islamic State. On the last day of this first 
session, 1 June 1945, Sukarno gave a moving speech in which he proposed that 
the new Indonesia should hold a position between a secular state and a state 
founded upon one religion alone. He formulated a doctrine of Five Pillars, 
Pancasila, including not merely belief in the One Supreme Deity, but also 
nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice.3 Sukarno’s speech 
later was published as Lahirnya Pancasila or ‘The Birth of Pancasila’. He 
stressed that he did not construct or invent the doctrine himself, but found it 
by looking into the soul of the Indonesian people. In this he stated that 
Pancasila was some kind of mythic age-old treasure of Indonesian society. On 
the theme of belief in the One Supreme Deity religious diversity of Indonesia 
was stressed:
Not only should the people of Indonesia have belief in God, but every 
Indonesian should believe in his own particular God. The Christian should 
worship God according to the teachings of Jesus Christ; Muslims 
according to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad; Buddhists should 
discharge their religious rites according to their own books. But let us all 
have believe in God. The Indonesian state shall be a state where every 
person can worship God in freedom ... without ‘religious egoism’. And the 
State of Indonesia should be a State incorporating the belief in God. Let 
us observe, let us practice religion, whether Islam or Christianity, in a 
civilised way ... the way of mutual respect.4
A committee of nine members was selected to formulate a further solution for 
the basis of the Indonesian state. In their meeting of 22 June 1945 they 
formulated a compromise, the so-called Piagam Jakarta or Jakarta Charter, to 
be used as a preamble to the future constitution (later the Arabic word 
Muqaddimah was also used). It repeated the five pillars of Pancasila, but now 
3 See, among many others, references to this ‘Birth of the Pancasila’, Boland 1971: 21-22; Kahin 
1952: 122-7.
4 Kahin 1952: 125.
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with the belief in the One Supreme Deity in the first place. Most controversial 
was its addition of the seven words after Belief in the Supreme Deity: ‘with the 
obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law’ (dengan kewajiban 
menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya). It was a minimum result 
for some Muslims who asked for designation as an Islamic State or at least a 
Muslim President.5
On 6 August 1945 a new body was instituted, Panitia Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for the Independence of 
Indonesia). This body had 25 members and held its first (and only) meeting on 
18-22 August 1945. Muhammad Hatta relates that on the 17th of August (after 
the declaration of independence) he received a telephone call from the Japanese 
navy (in control of East Indonesia where most Christians lived) saying that an 
officer wanted to see him immediately. This officer warned Hatta;
That the Protestants and Catholics in the regions that were under 
control of the Japanese navy had serious objections to the formula with 
respect to ‘the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law’. 
They recognised that this formula was not binding for them, but only for 
Muslims. But to include such a formula in a basic text as part of the 
Constitution would seriously discriminate them as a minority group. If 
this ‘discrimination’ would be prolonged, they would prefer to stay 
outside the Indonesian Republic.6
Hatta replied that on 22 June, the only Christian in the small committee of nine, 
Maramis, had no problem with this formula. Nevertheless, on 18 August Hatta 
called the four most outspoken Muslim members for a private meeting that 
lasted only 15 minutes in which they agreed to the removal of these seven 
words. This was later confirmed by the plenary session. Hatta adds here that 
this legal difference was mostly relevant for family law, because in other fields 
5 Boland 1971: 23-6; Aritonang 2004: 241-3.
6 Hatta 1982: 58.
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there were no specific rules to be applied.7 
We have presented the birth of Pancasila and the debate about introduction of 
shari’a with some detail in order to suggest the background of Pancasila as a 
solution for a political aspirations to give religion a place in Indonesian society. 
In the 1970s, the idea of ‘civil religion’ was developed by American social 
scientists and was not only seen as an American reality, but also applied to 
Japanese Shinto, as well as to the Pancasila ideology.8 A civil religion is not just 
a set of doctrines (Belief in One God or more deities, values like democracy, 
solidarity, tolerance), but also a set of rituals (flag hoisting, national anthem, a 
series of holidays to celebrate the independence and development of a nation) 
and the creation of a national myth through commemoration of heroes and 
tragedies. In the period up to 1965 Pancasila remained one of the most powerful 
obstacles to the development of Muslim domination, or an Islamic State that 
was the greatest threat to the new Republic of Indonesia. 
The establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs on 3 January 1946 
narrowed this vague religious basis of the new state towards a formal religion, 
because initially it concentrated on Islam, while in a process of two decades 
other religions also gained access to the ministry. One may debate about the 
translation of the Departemen Agama, plural or not?9 However, various regional 
Muslim groups in Aceh, West Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi were not content 
with Pancasila and a Ministry of Religious Affairs but continued armed revolts 
against the Pancasila State; only on 3 February 1965 could the Darul Islam 
leader Kahar Muzakkar be killed in his hiding place in Sulawesi.10
7 Hatta 1982: 60-1.
8 Robbert Bellah 1980; Purdy 1984, Intan 2006; see further Steenbrink 1990.
9 The programme INIS, Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, used the 
abbreviation MORA, Ministry of Religious Affairs. Feillard and Madinier 2011 is consistent in the 
use of the plural ‘religions’, but the translation Ministry of Religion is also used and can be defended 
as well.
10 Van Dijk 1981: 217.
Pancasila  as a Kind of Indonesian Shintoism?
Against the Idea of an Islamic State, 1945-1965
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There is an interesting comparison of American and Japanese civil 
religion by Robert Bellah which is also useful for defining Indonesian civil 
religion. Robert Bellah begins his discussion with the statement that ‘in no 
society can religion and politics ignore each other’. However, he sees two 
extremes: American and Japanese society. He defines the United States as 
modern with a high degree of differentiation between religion and politics, also 
separation of social issues and individual liberty. For Bellah, Japan is still 
archaic: divinity, society and the individual are still one.11 Like American civil 
religion, Pancasila is a mythical and ritual instrument to bind a diverse nation 
together. But Pancasila is also quite different from American civil religion. It is 
very strictly formulated, in the 1970s courses and school books were created, 
there is a national holiday in memory of the seven generals who were killed in 
1965 as ʻ Day of Confirmation of Pancasila’, and on the 17th of every month 
there is a special ceremony to celebrate the ideology. In the Suharto period, 
there was even a National Committee for the Formulation of Pancasila.12 A 
1985 law stipulated that Pancasila must be mentioned as the ‘sole basis for this 
society’ in the charter of all political, social and cultural institutions. This was 
done after the national congress in 1983 had declared that Pancasila was ‘not a 
religion’; apparently it looked very much like a formalized religion. Pancasila is 
different from Japanese civil religion or Shinto, because it is a modern creation, 
did not develop over centuries, and it originated in a clear pluriformity of 
religious convictions within the country and was placed besides the existing 
religions.
In 1945-1965, outspoken Muslims protested against Pancasila, while the 
Indonesian Communists just accepted its formula, even the ‘belief in the One 
Supreme Deity’. This is in contrast to the following period, 1965-1998 of 
Suharto’s New Order, when Pancasila was used as the magic formula against 
Communism, and all religions embraced Pancasila as an effective instrument to 
eliminate Communism.
11 Bellah 1980: 28.
12 BP7, Badan Penasihat Presiden tentang Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila.
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In line with the character of the two institutions where I was invited to deliver 
a lecture, I will pay some extra attention to Catholic leaders. The first is the 
Divine Word Missionary (SVD), Dr. Jan Raats. Like many people in East 
Indonesia where the largest number of Christians are found, Dr. Raats was in 
favour of the new nation as a loose federation of nearly-independent states. A 
specialist in canon law, Raats drafted the constitution for the new Negara 
Indonesia Timur or State of East Indonesia (NIT) together with the Balinese 
chairman of the provisional NIT parliament, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung. 
Among the representatives who attended the constitutional meeting for the 
new state in November-December 1946 in Den Pasar, Bali, three Catholics 
represented Flores: besides Dr. Raats, there was an indigenous SVD Priest 
named Adrianus Conterius. The third representative of Flores was Louis E. 
Monteiro, alumnus of the Catholic teacher training school. Timor was 
represented by two Protestants (a teacher and a minister) and by the first 
Catholic priest from the island ordained in 1942, Gabriel Manek SVD, from 1951 
bishop of Larantuka and after 1961 archbishop of Ende.13 In the preamble and 
the 148 articles of the Constitution for the State of East of Indonesia, Pancasila 
never was mentioned as the basis of the state. However, the preamble is clear 
that God and religion are important aspects of this state: ‘The State recognizes 
and honours the fact that in the State of East Indonesia the concept of God and 
religion are very special pillars for society and for the individual lives of the 
citizens.’14
There was quite a pragmatic anti-Javanese feeling, mixed with support 
for the partial autonomy of an Eastern Indonesian State. This did not diminish 
the sympathy of the people of Flores towards Sukarno who stayed in exile in 
Ende between 1935 and 1938 and had developed a good relationship with the 
13 For these representations, see Gde Agung 1985: 801.
14 Different from the Indonesian national constitution which was formulated in Malay/Indonesian, 
the State of East Indonesia used Dutch as its language of debates. ‘De Staat erkent en eerbiedigt 
het feit, dat in den Staat Oost-Indonesië Godsbegrip en godsdienst bij uitstek de grondslagen zijn 
van de samenleving en van het leven van iederen burger afzonderlijk.’ Staatsregeling 1949: 
Preamble.
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Catholic missionaries and the community. However, when the State of East 
Indonesia dissolved itself and became a full member of the new Indonesian 
Republic in early 1950, as someone who too strongly had promoted the division 
of Indonesia, Father Raats had to leave the country. Since that time he worked 
in the Philippines and was never able to return to Indonesia.15
The most impressive formulation of Catholic thinking about Pancasila 
was without doubt the speech given in 1959 by Jesuit priest and philosopher 
Nicolaus Drijarkara (1913-1967). Drijarkara, born in a nominal Muslim family, 
was a first generation convert to Catholicism, because he had attended a 
Catholic secondary school. Drijarkara later studied at the major seminary of 
Yogyakarta and at the Jesuit Gregoriana University in Rome, where he 
obtained a doctoral degree in philosophy with a dissertation on the French 
priest-philosopher Nicolas Malebranche. He concentrated more on philosophy of 
culture, also labelled contextual theology.16
In February 1959, the Society for the Promotion of Pancasila held a five-
day seminar in Yogyakarta, where also President Sukarno was present. 
Drijarkara delivered a major speech, that later was published in English 
translation by the Ministry of Information. Its beginning sounds more or less 
like a confession of faith about the basis of the Indonesian Republic, or rather 
something like fides quaerens intellectum, a firm belief that seeks rational 
arguments:
Here in this seminar, we are meditating in common about Pancasila. To 
ponder over Pancasila does not mean at all that we hold doubts about 
the position of Pancasila in the way of life of the Indonesian Nation. We 
are convinced that in Pancasila we have the best possible basis for our 
State. But if we are already convinced that these Principles of ours are 
correct, why do we hold a seminar about them? Does this not jeopardise 
them? To this objection we reply firmly that it is precisely this deep 
conviction of ours which causes us to think more deeply about those 
15 John Prior in Aritonang & Steenbrink (eds.) 2008: 251-2.
16 Prior 2003: 173-5 and Prior in Aritonang & Steenbrink (eds.) 2008: 786-9.
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Principles, as we are doing now.17
Drijarkara started the discussion of Pancasila with a quite philosophical 
question, formulated in German: Was ist der Mensch and was ist seine Stellung 
im Sein? [What is man and what is his/her position in Being?] Here, Drijarkara 
develops a description of human beings as socially active and part of society 
with an ultimate goal of (again in German) das liebende Mit-sein [togetherness 
in love].18 In this way Drijarkara praises Sukarno while summarizing the 
Pancasila doctrine as gotong-royong or mutual help in a traditional society. He 
puts the theoretical problem about ‘someone with the Pancasila attitude but 
living outside Religion: is this not in conflict?’ Drijarkara here answers that this 
is never a reality because we never live in a social vacuum. And all Indonesians 
live in a religious society or group. Religion, however, should develop without 
control of the state and enjoy full freedom in its own field.19
A third person to be mentioned here is Ignacius Kasimo, born in 1900 
and the first Catholic convert from his nominal Muslim family. He became a 
veterinarian, also leader of the small Catholic political party and so member of 
the national parliament in 1945, minister of economic affairs in 1947. His party 
garnered 2% of the votes in the first general elections of 1955 (where the 
Protestants had 2.6% and the large Muslim parties 39.3%). In 1957 he left the 
Sukarno government because he felt Sukarno was too close to the Communists. 
In this way he shows that in the Sukarno period of 1945-1965, Pancasila was 
instrumental in keeping nationalists and Communists together. Not only were 
some Muslim hardliners, but also some Catholic leaders like Kasimo, not happy 
with the way this solution worked.
17 Drijarkara 1960: 7. This is the official translation as published by the Ministry of Information. The 
original Indonesian text was published in the Catholic journal Basis and reprinted in Drijarkara 
2006: 831-65.
18 Drijarkara 1960: 9 & 19.
19 Drijarkara 1960: 33-4.
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After the bloody change of government in 1965-1966, the New Order 
administration of Suharto kept religion out of direct politics, but gave it a very 
important role in society. In the decade 1966-1976 not only did many people 
become more active mosque-going Muslims, quite a few Indonesians also 
embraced Christianity. Formal adherence became much more widespread as a 
guarantee against accusations of being Communist. It became more and more 
difficult for small, local spiritual movements to engage in activities, seek 
adherents or even simply to survive. In the national legal system, the role of 
the five actually recognised religions (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Protestant 
and Catholic Christianity) was strengthened by the marriage law of 1974 which 
required that all marriages should be administered according to the rules of the 
couple’s religion. This law provided a great job opportunity for Muslim officials 
within the Department of Religion and for functionaries of other religions. It 
also led to a quite effective ban on inter-religious marriages.20 Besides the social 
obligation to opt for one religion in 1967-1970, the marriage law of 1974 marks a 
turn in the importance of religion in society. There was also a sharp increase 
on the hours spent in religious courses in schools in the 1970s.
In 1988, a new law on education stipulated that pupils must participate in 
religious education according to their own religion (and that of their parents). 
At that time, exceptions were still made for pupils who attended private 
schools (in most cases, Muslim pupils at Christian schools). In 2003 another Law 
on National Education would formulate in much stricter terms that all children 
should receive religious education according to their own private religion, and 
here the implementation was formulated in an unquestionable way. In 1989 a 
law on (Muslim) religious courts was accepted, followed in 1991 by a 
presidential decree that a Compilation of Islamic Law in Indonesia, formulated 
20 Pompe 1988 and 1991; Aritonang 2004: 405-412 and 423-430.
1965-1998 Pancasila  Against Communism: 
The Promotion of Adherence to a Global Religion
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by experts of the Ministry of Religion should be used at all these courts.21
This movement of Islamic fervour also gave rise to a number of radical 
and militant Muslim groups who attacked night clubs, restaurants serving 
alcoholic drinks or simply still open in the month of Ramadan. Critics claim that 
their methods looked like gangsterism: when restaurants paid enough money 
they would be ‘spared’ if they would not show their activities too clearly to the 
outside world. Thus, even in this case there was a mixture of religious 
enthusiasm and common crime and greed.22 In addition to the (partial) 
implementation of shari’a in various regions, several laws affected the role of 
religion in society during this period. Besides the Law on National Education, 
already mentioned above, several proposals for a bill of inter-religious harmony 
were circulated from 2003, but no final draft was accepted by parliament. 
However, in 2006 the Minister of Religion and the Minister of the Interior 
issued two joint decrees (no 8 and 9, 2006), On the role of the heads of local 
government in the protection of interreligious harmony and the building of 
houses of worship. This ruling confirmed two decrees of 1978 about the ban on 
propagation of one’s faith to people who already embraced a recognised religion. 
The decrees further order that in all 33 provinces and in all 405 districts a 
FKUB, Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama or Forum for Harmony of the 
Faithful must be established.
Disagreement and Conflict
Above we have indicated the major steps towards a general strengthening in 
the position of all five major religions in Indonesia from 1966 until the first 
decade of the 21st century. This process, however, was not without debate and 
conflict. The Department of Religions, granting positions primarily but not 
exclusively to Muslims, generally was in favour of a strong policy of harmony 
21 See Aritonang 2004: 448-453 and Mujiburrahman 2006: 192-3 for the many earlier steps in this 
field. Nurlaelawati 2007 describes the whole procedure.
22 For the rise of radical Muslim groups, see Jamhari 2003, and Jamhari and Jajang 2004. For Laskar 
Jihad, see Noorhaidi 2005.
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and peace between religions. In the late 1940s, sections for Catholics and 
Protestants were created in the Ministry, in addition to the initial and largest 
one for Muslims. In 1958, a special section for Hinduism was created and in 
1980 a Buddhist section was created as well.
The Ministry did not solely represent the Muslims and therefore in 1975 
it stimulated, financially and by providing facilities, the foundation of a 
Indonesian  Council of Muslim Clerics Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI. This 
new body was to be a national body for all Muslims, independent of the 
government, like the Catholic bishops or the Protestant Council of Churches. 
Representatives of the two largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama, but also representatives of many other organizations, joined 
this initiative. In 1981 this new body came in conflict with the Minister of 
Religion, Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara. MUI President Hamka had issued a 
fatwa declaring it prohibited or haram that Muslims should participate in 
Christian celebrations of Christmas. It was stated that MUI had received many 
complaints about Muslim pupils in Christian schools who were urged to act as 
Joseph, Mary or an angel in Christmas plays or sing in the choir at Christmas 
celebrations. To people who complained about these practices, Christians had 
answered that the harmony of religions would be endangered if they should 
refuse participation. Many pupils dared not complain, for fear of repercussions 
during their examinations.
This prohibition by MUI was strongly attacked by the Minister of 
Religions and was withdrawn from publication soon after it had become publicly 
known. However, Hamka resigned as President of MUI and reproached the 
Minister of Religions, a prominent Muslim in his own right, of intimidating 
Muslim leaders. Minister Alamsjah accused MUI President Hamka of acting 
against Pancasila that should promote inter-religious harmony, while Hamka 
accused the government of interference with religion and of attempts to 
introduce Pancasila as a new state religion.23
In the early and middle 1980s, with its strong support for Pancasila as a 
23 Steenbrink 1993: 236-237 for a more detailed discussion on this and other debates.
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method for interreligious harmony, it was Muhammad Natsir who strongly 
protested what he called government-promoted syncretism. One of the booklets 
for Pancasila Ethics, an obligatory subject for kindergarten until the first year 
of university studies, contained a statement ‘that all religions profess the belief 
in Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa, the One Supreme Deity.’  Natsir, a former prime 
minister who was jailed in the early 1960s for his anti-Communist position, 
protested against this and similar formulas. One of these was a question about 
a case of a burial. ‘If you see that people bring a dead person to a cemetery, be 
it a faithful of your own or of another religion, you should always pray for his/
her soul to God Almighty.’ As a follower of modernist Islam which had resisted 
since the 1930s the idea that human prayers and offerings could change the fate 
of people who had already died. That was superstition for him, because all 
human beings carry their own burden in the scrutiny of their deeds before 
God.24
Not all debates about Pancasila and the definition of Islam were so quiet. 
On 28 March 1981 a group that called itself Komando Jihad hijacked a Garuda 
plane on an inland flight from Palembang to Medan. They took the plane to 
Bangkok, where they asked for the release of some 80 Komando Jihad 
members from Indonesian prisons. A group of Indonesian army Special Forces 
attacked them. One survived the attack and was brought to court where he 
attacked the ideology of Pancasila and its formula of the One Supreme Deity. 
According to him the Indonesian word Ketuhanan is a collective word just like 
Deity, which also can refer to more divine entities, and is comparable to 
gunungan which may refer to a chain of mountains, a collective word signifying 
a plural reality.
The aforementioned Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, Minister of Religion 
in 1978-1983, designed a program of three dialogues related to religion and 
politics: one internal within the various religious communities, one between the 
major religions, the last between the religions and the government. The first 
indicates that religions are not homogeneous and that there is never any 
24 More examples of these case and references in Steenbrink 1990: 134-5.
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individual person or collective body that can speak for all Muslims, Christians, 
Buddhists or Hindus. Also in Indonesia the history of these religions has been 
characterized by a long series of debates, dissensions and conflicts. The 
Indonesian government tried to promote harmony and cooperation in a 
program of national economic and social development and even to take the lead 
in this field. The early 1990s creation of ICMI, an organization of Muslim 
Intellectuals, served this purpose through an effort to counteract the higher 
level of education among Christians and Buddhists in Indonesia. However, 
already in the 1990s there was a strong increase in hard-line Muslim groups 
like FPI (Front Pembela Islam or the Islamic Defence League), claiming that 
true Islam was in danger in Indonesia. The rise of violent militias like Lasykar 
Jihad in 1999-2002, the Bali bombings of 2002, and local groups struggling for 
the (partial) introduction of shari’a law in some districts and provinces led two 
French scholars to publish a book entitled The End of Innocence? Indonesian 
Islam and the Temptation of Radicalism, (Feillard and Madinier 2011). The 
French version of this book had the subtitle: From 1967 until our days, 
indicating that this was a process that had started in the early years of the 
Suharto government. 
In 2009 two leaders of the largest Muslim organizations of the country, 
Achmed Syafii Maarif of Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912) and Abdurrahman 
Wahid of Nahdlatul Ulama (founded in 1926) jointly published an angry book 
with the title: The Illusion of an Islamic State, warning many compatriots that 
they should remain faithful to the ideal of a pluralist country where no religion 
should dominate politics. They warn against ‘infiltrations of Middle East Salafi 
and other hard-line activists’ in mosques and religious schools. Must we talk 
about the failure of Pancasila harmony? What could be the reason for this 
failure?
The Initial Mistake: A Compromise with an Intrinsic Flaw
In the Indonesian Constitution we find two basic formulas related to religion. In 
the preamble the five pillars of Pancasila are formulated with as first the (belief 
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in) One Supreme Deity. This is repeated in article 29, where it is added that ‘The 
state will guarantee the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own 
religion or belief.’ The committee for preparation of the constitution added here 
that religion (agama) must be understood as a monotheistic religion, while belief 
(kepercayaan) must be seen as based upon this religion.25  In later discourse, 
however, kepercayaan was seen as a new or local tradition, a tribal religion or 
new sect, that somehow should be formally seen as part of one the five major 
global religions. The revival of traditional Batak religion was in this way 
formulated as a special brand of Hinduism and called Parmalim or Karo 
Hinduism, while the Dayak tribal religion in its modern style is called 
Kaharingan Hinduism. Also in other regions of Indonesia (South Sulawesi, 
Tengger) such constructions have been made.26
In a social and legal practice that reduced ‘religion’ to a small number of 
global religions with specific characteristics (monotheism, Holy Scripture, a 
prophet, global character and recognition), only after much debate Confucianism 
was added. In 2002, a national holiday of Imlek (Chinese New Year) for 
Confucians was formally adopted, and in 2006 it was recognized as the sixth 
religion within the formal structure of the Ministry of Religions.
Religion was not only reduced to the five or six big players, these diverse 
and dynamic institutions were also reduced to homogeneous, uniform entities. 
This happened through efforts to create bodies that should represent the 
communities in their relations to the government. Above we have seen already 
the problems and conflicts that MUI created in its 1981 fatwa about Muslim 
participation at Christian celebrations of Christmas. It was not the only clash of 
MUI with other Muslims and with the government. In a session of 26-29 July 
2005, MUI issued 11 quite controversial fatwa. One was a ban on religious 
pluralism and religious liberalism, apparently an attack on the Indonesian 
Liberal Muslim Network, Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL. Another was a ban on 
women as leader of prayers (a reaction on the American Muslim Amina Wadud 
who led a mixed male/female Muslim congregation in Friday prayers on 18 
25 Basic text here is Yamin 1960, vol. III: 801-2.
26 Ramstedt (ed), 2004.
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March 2005 in a building of Virginia Commonwealth University). A third fatwa 
was against the claim of Ahmadiyyah community that they are Muslims. This 
was at a time when Muslim hardliners openly attacked the Indonesian 
Ahmadiyyah community, established mostly in West-Java since the 1930s. 
Mosques were burnt down, houses set on fire, with a number of people killed. 
The Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took no action against 
this kind of violence. Instead he signed a decree involving a prohibition on 
teachings or public displays of the Ahmadiyah religion in June 2008. 
International organizations have blamed him for this refusal to protect freedom 
of religion for them and to curb the illegal violence against this smaller sect.
Non-Muslim organizations are also not free from government 
interference in their actions. Quite interesting is the case of the national 
Buddhist organization (comparable to the Muslim MUI), the WALUBI, 
Representation of the Buddhist Community in Indonesia (or Perwakilan Umat 
Buddha Indonesia), which was founded in 1979 by Oka Diputhera, the highest 
official for Buddhism in the Department of Religion from 1959 until 1991. 
WALUBI is a compromise between lay and monk leadership in Buddhist affairs. 
Because of the fact that there are few monks in Indonesia (quite a few are from 
Thailand) and because of the prominent position of Chinese lay business people 
in WALUBI, during his presidency (1999-2001) President Abdurrahman Wahid 
tried to put the monks in a position of unambiguous leadership. Two years after 
his abdication he wrote:
The values of the Muslim community are defined by the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, of the Catholics by the Conference of Catholic Bishops, of the 
Protestants by the National Council of Churches, of the Confucians by 
the High Council of the Konghucu Religion of Indonesia. In this way the 
Buddhist community should, according to this author, follow the religious 
values as formulated by the High Council of Monks in Indonesia, 
Konferensi Agung Sangha Indonesia. They should not follow some party 
or organization of lay people. These lay people have to obey the religious 
specialists. This we have to realise as government or as members of 
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society. As long as this matter is not settled, our life as a nation is still in 
danger.27
This is quite a remarkable statement about internal debates of the Buddhist 
community by a very distinguished Muslim.
Similar circumstances faced Hinduism in Indonesia as well. In 1959 in 
Bali a Hindu Society, Parisada Hindu Darma was established. It functioned as 
the supervising body for the academic education of Hindu specialists, training 
teachers of Hindu religion in Balinese and some other schools. Its activities 
were subsidized by the Indonesian government, so this Hindu organization 
under leadership of the Ministry of Religion followed the rules of modern 
Indonesia: no attention being given to caste, equal opportunities to women and 
a strong emphasis on monotheism. If we look at the books used in primary and 
secondary education, it is not the traditional rituals, not the sacred mantras, not 
the classical texts as used in the Hindu-Balinese temples by the priests or 
pedanda of Brahmanic offspring, that dominates the content of these Hindu 
school books, but pious meditations and prayers to the One Supreme Deity, 
ethical rules that also can originate from any ethical philosophy. With some 
kind of exaggeration one could label this development in modern Hinduism in 
Bali as a kind of adaptation to Muslim doctrine and practices. Quite 
understandable for a small religious community in such an overwhelming 
Muslim country.
We should not exaggerate the danger of the government involvement in 
religious affairs. In 2006 an Indonesian student defended a thesis in the 
Netherlands (Tilburg University) under the title: Official Reform of Islam. State 
Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966-
2004.28  The number of mosques, of visitors to mosques, of faithful who went to 
the hajj pilgrimage, of copies of the Qur’an, of pupils in schools who received 
more religious education, all this has increased in an impressive way during the 
Suharto period. But much of this has been orchestrated top-down and in a 
27 Wahid 2006: 136-137. More on this matter in Steenbrink 2013: 16-27.
28 Ichwan 2006.
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uniform, nearly monopolistic way in these three decades. The role, not of official 
Islam, but also of the Christian churches, Buddhist and Hindu communities, has 
grown considerably. But there were costs too, intolerance for deviations and 
innovations, uncontrolled terrorism of Muslim hardliners and also of aggressive 
Christian fundamentalist preachers.
Mangunwijaya and Ayu Utami: Too Much Religion and Too Organised Piety
Yusuf Biljarta Mangunwijaya (1929-1999) was a Catholic priest, architect, 
famous novelist, and well-known social activist. He was invited to give the 
keynote speech at the annual meeting of the Catholic bishops in November 1996 
entitled Gereja Dias pora, Gereja Berkualitas [(Only) A Diaspora Church can be 
a Quality Church]. In his opinion, there is too much religion in Indonesia in 
general and especially within the Roman Catholic Church: too many committees, 
organizations such as the charismatic movement, Legio Mariae, choirs, 
recollections, picnics and hiking, organized by parishes and many other 
activities. In his opinion, the Indonesian church is overactive, organizes so much 
that this church is in danger of becoming a sect, concentrating religious life on 
the parish and its organizations. He extolled the Jewish sabbath-ceremonies in 
the family and noted that the busy activities in the parish threatened not only 
the family as the nucleus for religious educa tion and practice, but also the 
spread of personal faith in the everyday life of society. But this qualification of 
‘too much religion’ or an overheated religious role in society is for him also 
clear among other religious denominations. Pancasila counts five pillars: belief 
in the One Supreme Deity is only one, democracy and social justice deserve 
more attention and even a first place. Mangunwijaya also developed a special 
inter-religious system of education, where religious education never should start 
with the particular denominational characteristics and formulas, but with the 
focus on the intensification and analysis of natural religious emotions of all 
children.29
29 For more about this idea, see Steenbrink 1998.
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An even more critical attack on the monopoly of the institutional 
religions has been initiated by the novelist Ayu Utami (b. 1968). Her first two 
novels (Saman 1998, Larung 2001) were partly about an activist Catholic priest 
who sided with the poor, fighting the destruction of natural forest by the 
combination of agro-business and the corrupt military. As a consequence, the 
priest had to leave his formal position in the Catholic Church. In her great novel 
of 2008, Bilangan Fu she attacks the three dangers of our time: Modernism, 
Monotheism and Militarism. Modernism has destroyed our naïve and innocent 
view of our world, annihilated our ability to see miracles, to experience the 
divine. Monotheism has reduced the rich variety of spiritual ways to six, the 
officially recognised international religions of Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Confucianism, Catholicism and Protestantism. These great global religions are 
especially damaging the rise and development of true spiritual life when they 
express themselves in a fundamentalist way. (Anti) Militarism is presented in a 
somewhat nuanced way: not all military are bad people. They are very 
powerful and so it may be wise to seek the cooperation of good officers and try 
to do good things with them. This will not always work. In Bilangan Fu and 
her subsequent three novels, Ayu Utami glorifies the revival of old Javanese 
spirituality, although this results in opposition from the bureaucracy and 
Muslim hardliners. She complains about the dominating role of the military in 
modern Indonesia, in politics, economy and social life and culture and joins the 
call: ‘Send the military back [from economy, government administration] to their 
barracks!’ This is followed immediately by a similar call the ‘ulama must return 
to the barracks. Send the religious people back to their different places, because 
they also are filled with lust for power. No different from the military, political 
leaders and all other people. No single person should claim absolute truth.’30
These two Catholic voices are not representative of their community. 
They are rather a critical minority, but their analysis is a quite strong 
30 Utami 2008: 482. Notwithstanding her overt sympathy for traditional Javanese religiosity, Ayu 
Utami is much respected in official Catholic circles. In 2012, Catholic institutions launched a great 
movie on the first Indonesian bishop, Albertus Soegijapranata. Utami was asked to write the more 
or less ‘official’ biography of this Catholic bishop. See Utami 2012.
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illustration of what liberal Catholics think about the public role of religion in 
general. They are joined by many more liberal Muslims as well.31
Conclusion with a Personal Anecdote
From March 1981 until mid-1988, I was a lecturer at IAIN, the State Academy 
of Islamic Studies in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (now UIN, Universitas Islam 
Negeri). My major duty was to teach courses on ‘orientalism’, understood as 
introduction to Western traditions of religious research on Islam in general, the 
Qur’an and the history of Indonesian Islam. I gave also a course on Christianity 
yearly for some 60-100 students, all Muslims. I regularly uttered criticism of 
Christian practices or doctrines, of the Pope and some fundamentalist 
Protestants. I also sometimes showed admiration for Muslim traditions. 
Therefore, once a student asked me in class: ‘Sir, why do you not become a 
Muslim?’ My answer was that I had some friends and colleagues who indeed 
embraced Islam. I saw how they were pampered in their new community: one 
even received a free ticket for the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca from the Indonesian 
Ministry of Religions. But they were recent converts, mu`allaf and could not be 
critical in their new religion. They had to remain silent and just accept the full 
100% of their new religion. So, I preferred to remain a critical Catholic, rather 
than a tame or meek recent convert. Anyway, it is still quite uncommon to be 
an atheist in contemporary Indonesia. A religious label is a quite important 
indicator of one’s identity. This has only grown in the last 50 years, during the 
Suharto period and also in the period since then. 
Different from the situation in Western Europe (and maybe also Japan), religion 
has gained more and more prestige, influence and importance. Some causes and 
consequences have been sketched out in this presentation. From the beginning 
of independent Indonesia the ambiguous concept of Pancasila has been used to 
stimulate, also to control various manifestations of religions and to prevent 
31 Maarif and Wahid 2009; also Azyumardi Azra in the newspaper Republika, 21 August 2014: 
‘Waspada Transnasionalisme’.
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conflicts. According to the various situations its use was also different. This 
contribution has given an image of the major manifestations of this flexible 
concept.32
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